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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND FOREIGN
SEARCHES: A STANDARD FOR THE ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE
The federal and state courts originally adopted the common law
rules of evidence which allowed the admission of illegally or unconstitutionally seized evidence.' The federal courts recognized that the
fourth amendment' placed limitations on federal officials, but not
until Weeks v. United States3 did the Supreme Court require the
exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment by
federal officials.' In Weeks however, the Court stated that property
seized by state or local officials not acting under a claim of federal
authority was not governed by the fourth amendment, and held that
fourth amendment limitations applied only to the United States government and its agencies.' Subsequently, in Wolf v. Colorado,6 the
Court held that the commands of the fourth amendment were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"7 and thus were applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 The Court, however, refused to require the exclusion of evil See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904); Commonwealth v. Dana,
43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841). The courts accepted the common law rule that
admitted any evidence relevant to the offense charged if it had been obtained by a
method which did not detract from the reliability of the evidence.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id. at 391-92. In Weeks, the Court asserted that it was the duty of all who were
entrusted with the enforcement of the laws under the federal system to insure that the
limitations and restraints of the fourth amendment were observed. The Court specifically stated that the practice of securing convictions through the use of evidence
unlawfully seized "should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts. . . ."Id. at
392. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule, its history, and effectiveness, see Oaks,
Studying the ExclusionaryRule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970).
232 U.S. at 398 (1914).
£ 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7 Id. at 27. Wolf followed a series of cases which declared that some of the rights
present in the Bill of Rights were incorporated in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because these rights were fundamental to the American system.
See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)(first amendment right to
freedom of speech incorporated); see also Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 27-28 (1949). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 states
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dence seized unconstitutionally by state officials, stating that the
rule was a matter of judicial implication and was not constitutionally
required.' The Court determined that the states should be allowed to
decide what means of enforcement should be adopted to prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures.
For twelve years, the Supreme Court allowed the states to consider alternatives, but in Mapp v. Ohio," the Court extended the
exclusionary rule to prohibit the admission of evidence seized unconstitutionally by state officials." The Court noted that the exclusionary rule is of constitutional origin rather than merely a rule of evidence. 12 Thus, the exclusionary rule currently operates to prevent the
admission in state and federal criminal courts of evidence seized by
state and federal officials in violation of the Constitution. 3 Federal
and state prosecutors, however, may use evidence seized illegally by
private persons where there is no impermissible public or governmental compulsion against the accused. 4 Although several United States
courts of appeals have considered whether evidence seized by foreign
police in violation of fourth amendment standards should be excluded, 5 the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. 6
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. . ....
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 33 (1949).
" 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 655.
12 Id. at 649. The Mapp Court stated:
There are in the cases of this Court some passing references to the
Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and unequivocal
language of Weeks-and its later paraphrase in Wolf-to the effect
that the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed.
Id. The Court provided no support for its assertion that the exclusionary rule is of
constitutional origin. In Weeks the Court never stated that the rule was constitutionally required, but asserted that the fourth amendment would be meaningless unless
an exclusionary rule was adopted to give its limitations force. Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. at 393 (1914).
," In United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976), the Court held that the fourth
amendment and the exclusionary rule will not be applied to prevent the admission of
unconstitutionally seized evidence in civil proceedings.
" Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 331-32 n.14 (1973), citing Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)(the fourth amendment's "origin and history clearly
show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies. . . ").
"SSee United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3163 (U.S.
Aug. 25, 1976) (No. 279); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 2226 (1976); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975)(evi-
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Until recently, the question of the admissibility of evidence seized
in foreign searches received little discussion." In the past year however, the Court of Military Appeals (COMA)' 8 and the Seventh Circuit have adopted opposing rationales governing foreign searches. 9 In
United States v. Marzano,2 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the admission of evidence seized by Grand Cayman police.2 1 Marzano was condence seized by Israeli police after contacts with American officials admitted); Kilday
v. United States, 481 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1973)(evidence seized by Argentine police
during an interrogation of Kilday and a search of his belongings admitted); United
States v. Tierney, 448 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972)(evidence seized during search of two
cars by Canadian police admitted); United States v. Shea, 436 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1970)
(per curiam); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969)(evidence seized during Philippine search of warehouses admitted
despite prior knowledge and limited involvement of American official); Brulay v.
United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967)(evidence
seized during Mexican search of car admitted); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965); Johnson v. United States, 207 F.2d 314
(5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938 (1954)(evidence seized by Cuban police
admitted).
" In United States v. Janis, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3033 n.31 (1976)(dictum), the Court
noted that the exclusionary rule "is not applicable where a . . .foreign government
commits the offending act."
" Since the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Stonehill v. United
States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), the federal courts have considered the foreign
search only in passing and generally have followed Stonehill as dispositive. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975)(no citation of Stonehill but
followed same analysis); United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1971). The
Stonehill court held that the fourth amendment applied to foreign searches only if
American officials substantially participated in the search. 405 F.2d at 743.
,1COMA is a specialized Article I court which hears only military appeals from
courts-martial. The court was given its authority by Congress in Article 67 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §867 (1970). The
court was created to enforce procedural safeguards which Congress guaranteed to
military personnel. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975); Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953). Its decisions with regard to military law are not
binding on the federal district courts, but are considered persuasive. Jackson v. McElroy, 163 F. Supp. 257, 266 (D.D.C. 1958). The United States courts of appeals have no
jurisdiction to review the actions of COMA, except collaterally by petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 746; Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
at 144. See note 101 infra. COMA frequently hears cases involving issues of law similar
to those considered by the United States district courts and courts of appeals.
" Compare United States v. Jordan, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664 (1975)
(hereinafter JordanI), modified, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976) (hereinafter
JordanII) with United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976).
" 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976).
2'Evidence seized included $22,300 in cash, a piece of paper, and two air tickets.
United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d at 277 (7th Cir. 1976)(Swygert, J., dissenting).
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victed in a federal court of conspiracy to commit theft of money from
Purolator Security, Inc., 2 taking more than three million dollars belonging to various banks from the possession of Purolator, 23 and transporting the stolen money in interstate and foreign commerce.2 4 The
evidence, seized during Marzano's arrest in Grand Cayman for refusing to give his name and address, was turned over to agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI had provided the Grand
Cayman police with a picture of Marzano and information about his
involvement in the United States robbery. United States agents were
present throughout the Grand Cayman police investigation, including the period during the arrest and search of Marzano, but did not
question him regarding the alleged American crimes and did not
physically participate in the search. Marzano was never charged with
the Grand Cayman offense, but was placed on a plane accompanied
by the FBI agents and was arrested on the United States charges
upon his arrival in Miami. In admitting the evidence, the Marzano
court held that the participation of the FBI agents was "too insignificant" to require the search conducted by a foreign official to be
judged by American standards.2 The court held that the FBI agents
were not participants merely because they provided information to a
foreign official who then took certain actions based on that information.25 The court was influenced by the fact that the foreign official
carefully limited the authority of the FBI agents while they were in
Grand Cayman, and that the FBI agents were merely accompanying
the foreign official at the time of Marzano's arrest.Y The court found
that the Grand Cayman police had acted to enforce Grand Cayman
laws, the search related to the Grand Cayman arrest, and the Grand
Cayman police voluntarily released the seized evidence to the FBI
2
agents. 1
In contrast to the Marzano court, COMA adopted more stringent
requirements for the admission of evidence seized in extraterritorial
searches in United States v. Jordan.2 9 COMA held that a foreign
search must meet fourth amendment standards regardless of whether
the evidence was seized by foreign police acting independently or in
- 18 U.S.C. §371 (1970).
- 18 U.S.C. §2113(b) (1970).
24 18 U.S.C. §2314 (1970).
21 537 F.2d at 270 (7th Cir. 1976).
25

Id.

'Id.

' Id. at 271.
23 U.S.C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664 (1975), modified, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 51
C.M.R. 375 (1976).
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conjunction with American officials.3 The Air Force, however, petitioned COMA to reconsider its decision and asserted that Jordan I
encouraged trials in foreign courts with no American constitutional
safeguards. 3 1 The Air Force also argued that the extension of the
exclusionary rule to searches directed by foreign officials resulted in
minimal deterrence and was not constitutionally required.2 On rehearing, COMA modified its holding and stated that where evidence
is seized by foreign police acting independently of American influence, the prosecution must demonstrate that the search was legal
under the law of the foreign country for the evidence to be admissible.3 COMA rejected the approach of the civilian federal courts reflected in Marzano to hold that a search by foreign police with American participation must comply with the fourth amendment as applied in the military community 34 if the prosecution wished to use the
3 Jordan I, 23 U.S.C.M.A. at 527, 50 C.M.R. at 666 (1975).
s' Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 158, 51 C.M.R. at 377 (1976).
32 Id. at 157, 51 C.M.R. at 376.
3 Id. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378.
11While COMA rejected the standard adopted by the federal courts for admitting
evidence seized in an extraterritorial search, COMA generally follows federal court
interpretations in applying the fourth amendment to the military community. See
United States v. Mayton, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 565, 566, 50 C.M.R. 784, 785 (1975) (per
curiam)(consent); United States v. Guerette, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 281, 284, 49 C.M.R. 530,
533 (1975)(probable cause); United States v. Soto, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 583, 585,37 C.M.R.
203, 205 (1967)(exigent circumstances). COMA appears to have modified the federal
court interpretation of the fourth amendment in two significant areas because of the
requirements of the military community. See note 59 infra. First, COMA has held that
a base or unit commander constitutionally may issue a search warrant on probable
cause although he is charged with the conflicting responsibility of maintaining order
and discipline, and thus is required to direct and often participate in investigations.
United States v. Staggs, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 113, 48 C.M.R. 672, 674 (1974). But cf.
United States v. Roberts, No. 30,818, slip op. at 3, n.6 (C.M.A. October 8, 1976)(dictum)(questioning whether unit commander can be a neutral and detached magistrate).
Second, at least until recently, an inspection has not been considered to be a search
requiring compliance with the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. United
States v. King, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 239, 240, 51 C.M.R. 618, 619 (1976); United States v.
Thomas, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 228, 231, 51 C.M.R. 607, 610 (1976). In King and Thomas,
COMA noted that the commander has authority to order inspections of persons and
property to determine the fitness, health, welfare, and security of the unit. Id. Whether
this authority permits the admission of evidence secured during the inspection is in
doubt.
The three judges of COMA appear divided on whether an inspection may be used
as a pretext to enter a government building for the purpose of investigating a criminal
matter. Judge Cook maintains that a serviceman has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the common areas of a military barracks including living quarters, and that
an inspection to detect contraband in these areas does not require a warrant. United
States v. Thomas, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 231, 51 C.M.R. at 610. For Judge Cook, fourth
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evidence seized.15 The Jordan II court defined "participation" as
presence at the scene of the search, requesting the search, or providing information, assistance, or direction which initiates, aids, or furthers the objective of the foreign search." This definition clearly requires application of the fourth amendment to the fruits of any search
where American officials have provided information which is used in
a foreign investigation culminating in a search, where American officials specifically request a search, or where they are present at the
scene during the search.
Jordan involved a search of an American serviceman and his living quarters for evidence of his involvement in a foreign crime. The
search occurred on an American military installation. Glenn Jordan,
an airman stationed in Bicester, England, was arrested by the local
police in connection with the investigation of several burglaries that
had occurred in British-owned housing. Jordan was interrogated by
the local police who requested permission to search his room. After
being denied the privilege of making a phone call, Jordan agreed to
the search, saying, "I can't really stop you. '3 The English police
secured Jordan's keys, and after notifying the American air police of
their intentions, 8 searched Jordan's room in the presence of the
amendment requirements must be met only when the government searches the personal property of the serviceman in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id. Chief Judge Fletcher, however, asserted that inspections necessary to perform the
command function of maintaining military preparedness were necessary and authorized by the Constitution, but that evidence seized during an inspection could not be
admitted in a criminal proceeding nor used to establish probable cause. Id. at 235, 51
C.M.R. at 614 (Fletcher, C.J., concurring in the result). Chief Judge Fletcher contended that this application of the exclusionary rule would prevent abuse of inspections. Senior Judge Ferguson viewed the method by which the evidence was obtained
as a search, and refused to distinguish between inspections and searches in determining whether the fourth amendment had been violated. Id. at 238, 51 C.M.R. at 617
(Ferguson, S.J., concurring in the result).
Recently, Senior Judge Ferguson was replaced by Judge Perry. In United States
v. Roberts, No. 30,818, slip op. at 10 (C.M.A. October 8, 1976), Judge Perry distinguished between "the traditional military inspection which looks at the overall fitness
of a unit to perform its military mission" and the shakedown inspection which is
designed to find specific evidence of a crime in a general area by means of a thorough
search of all persons and things in the area. Judge Perry held that the military inspection was a permissible deviation from civilian standards and probably expected by the
serviceman while the shakedown inspection was an unreasonable invasion of a person's
expectation of privacy and analogous to an unconstitutional dragnet search. Id. Chief
Judge Fletcher and Judge Cook continued to hold the same positions as in Thomas.
Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976).
3,Id. See text accompanying notes 52-66 infra.
31Jordan I, 23 U.S.C.M.A. at 526, 50 C.M.R. at 665 (1975).
1 Relations between United States armed forces stationed in England and the

1977]

FOREIGN SEARCHES

American police.39 The American police officers "took no part in the
search other than to unlock a padlock on [Jordan's] locker and to
look around the room."" In the course of the search, stolen property
from the burglarized premises was discovered. The evidence was photographed by an Air Force photographer at the English police officer's
request. The seized evidence subsequently was used in Jordan's
American court-martial trial.
COMA's holding in Jordan marked a sharp divergence from the
position of the federal appellate courts as manifested in Marzano.
The American courts traditionally have held that the exclusionary
rule will be applied in the foreign search context only if there is
substantial participation by American officials. 4 In contrast, COMA
held in JordanII that where American officials provided information,
requested a search, or were present during the search, failure to comply with the fourth amendment would result in the application of the
exclusionary rule to the evidence seized in the search.2
United Kingdom are governed by the Agreement between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T.
1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter SOFA]. Article VII, §6(a) of
that agreement requires the parties to "assist each other in the carrying out of all
necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production of evidence,
including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with
an offence." Id. at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 78. See text accompanying notes 58-66 infra.
1 Under the Jordan I definition, mere presence at an investigation constitutes
participation. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
'Jordan I, 23 U.S.C.M.A. at 526, 50 C.M.R. at 665 (1975).
' The substantial participation test was developed by the Ninth Circuit in Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968). Two other circuits have adopted
the substantial participation test. United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1971). In Stonehill, the court
held that "the Fourth Amendment could apply to raids by foreign officials only if
Federal agents so substantially participated in the raids so as to convert them into joint
ventures between the United States and the foreign officials." 405 F.2d at 743. The
court stated that in order to determine whether a joint venture existed, the actions of
the federal agent in the search and seizure must be compared "with the totality of the
acts done in the search and seizure." Id. at 744. The Stonehill court was persuaded
that substantial participation was not present since neither United States nor foreign
agents were involved in the selection of evidence for a United States investigation, all
activities of United States agents took place before the search or after its termination,
and the United States agents objected to the raid. Id. at 746. The court concluded that
"the casual presence of a Federal officer at the scene of a search is not sufficient to
make the Federal officer a participant. . . ." Id. No federal court ever has found that
the participation of American officials in a foreign search was substantial. See cases
cited in note 15 supra.
11Jordan1H,24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976). In view of the holdings
in Marzano v. United States, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976), and Stonehill v. United
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In considering whether the application of the fourth amendment
and the exclusionary rule is appropriate in a case involving evidence
derived from a foreign search in which there was some degree of
American involvement, the court's attention should focus on the involvement of the American agents since only they are subject to the
fourth amendment. 3 The limitations imposed by the United States
Constitution apply to American officials wherever they act in their
official capacity, whether at home or abroad." Thus, the activity of
the American official in relation to a foreign search is crucial in determining whether the fourth amendment should be applied to the
search and the evidence seized.
The Supreme Court has held that the determining factor in applying the fourth amendment to searches occurring entirely within the
United States is whether the federal agent shared in the securing or
selection of evidence by unconstitutional means. While the Court
made this statement prior to Mapp v. Ohio"6 and in the context of
federal-state searches, analogous reasoning should be applicable to
extraterritorial searches. 7 The courts, in the foreign search context,
States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), the courts of appeals probably would term the
American participation in Jordan as not substantial or too insignificant, and thus
admit the evidence. See discussion of substantial participation test in note 41 supra
and discussion of the Marzano opinion in text accompanying notes 20-28 supra. The
test developed in JordanII was explicitly rejected in United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d
120, 140 (5th Cir. 1976).
13 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). As the Court stated
in Reid:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power
and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with
all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he
happens to be in another land.
Id. The fourth amendment was specifically held to protect United States citizens
abroad and to apply to United States military officials in Best v. United States, 184
F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951) ("the United States
Army officers who conducted the search were subject to the fourth amendment").
1 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d
738, 749 (9th Cir. 1968)(Browning, J., dissenting). Prior to Jordan I, the fourth amendment had never been held to limit the actions of foreign officials. See Stonehill v.
United States, 405 F.2d at 743; Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir.
1967); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965).
4' Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949).
" 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
,7 In Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), the Ninth Circuit
noted that it was adopting a test analogous to the substantial participation test developed by the Supreme Court prior to Mapp for determining when to apply the fourth
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should follow this reasoning and focus on whether the American official is involved in the search before its objectives are accomplished."
Both COMA in Jordan II and the Seventh Circuit in Marzano followed this approach. The opinions, however, differ regarding the definition of what constitutes involvement.
The traditional view reflected in Marzano holds that a violation
of the Constitution occurs only where there is substantial participation by American officials in a search which did not comply with the
fourth amendment.4 9 This definition necessarily allows a degree of
involvement in foreign searches which is permissible without violating the Constitution.w However, the standard adopted by the courts
amendment to evidence that state officials had seized and federal prosecutors sought
to introduce. The substantial participation test was developed to assist the federal
courts in the administration of the "silver platter" doctrine. The doctrine was first
recognized in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the Court stated that
evidence seized by state officers not acting under a claim of federal authority was
admissible in a federal prosecution despite the fact that it would have been excluded
if seized by federal officers. Id. at 398. The doctrine was given its name in Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949). Under the "silver platter" doctrine, evidence
seized by state officers, which would have violated the fourth amendment if the seizure
had been by federal officers, was admissible in federal court unless the purpose of the
search was to obtain evidence of a federal offense, Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S.
310 (1927), or federal officers participated in the search, Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. at 78; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927). The "silver platter" doctrine
as applied in federal-state relations was rejected by the Supreme Court in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
11See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). In Lustig, the Court stated,
"It is immaterial whether a federal agent originated the idea or joined in it while the
search was in progress. So long as he was in it before the object of the search was
completely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in it." Id. Judge
Browning argued in dissent in Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 751 (9th Cir.
1968), that under the Lustig analysis, the courts must view the search as a functional
whole in determining whether American agents participated. The Lustig analysis appears to be susceptible to an interpretation that American involvement in the coordination or identification of items to be seized in a search may be sufficient involvement
although American agents are not present during the search. While this interpretation
was rejected by the Stonehill majority, Id. at 746, COMA appears to have adopted a
similar interpretation in Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976).
' See cases cited in note 41 supra.
See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968). In Stonehill,
an agent of the Internal Revenue Service learned of potential violations of the United
States tax laws and instituted an investigation. Information gathered during the investigation was communicated to Philippine authorities who were gathering evidence for
the deportation of Stonehill. The Philippine authorities decided to raid Stonehill's
business. Although the American official had objected to the raid, he allowed his home
to be used for meetings to plan the raid, and on one occasion asked that a specific
building be included in the search. The American official was shown the Philippine
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of appeals does not assist the American official who is aware of the
impending foreign search in determining whether or to what extent
he should become involved. 5' Rather, the standard adopted in
Marzano and by the other courts of appeals encourages American
officials to participate in foreign searches where participation will
further American law enforcement interests. The standard fails to
provide American officials with guidance as to when their participation will be considered substantial, resulting in the application of the
fourth amendment to the search. The uncertainty which results from
the adoption of the substantial participation test places the law enforcement official in the position of potentially rendering valuable
evidence inadmissible if his participation subsequently is determined
to have been substantial. Clearly, the courts have a responsibility to
define carefully when the fourth amendment and the exclusionary
rule will apply in the foreign search context. Marzano fails to provide
this necessary guidance.
This analysis would appear to support the holding of COMA in
Jordan II with regard to a foreign search with American involvement.
COMA's holding would discourage any unconstitutional American
involvement in foreign searches since it excludes evidence derived
from a foreign search in which any form of American assistance,
whether providing information or participating in the search, was
received where the search violates the fourth amendment."2 However,
the holding of COMA in Jordan II regarding evidence seized in a
foreign search in which Americans are involved results in the disruption of international cooperation in solving crimes which cross territorial boundaries in the civilian context,53 and conflicts with the poliwarrant, which did not comply with Philippine law, id. at 743, prior to the search and
secured permission to copy fruits of the search. On the day of the raid, the American
official waited at Philippine police headquarters for the raid to be completed. When
the Philippine police had difficulty in identifying the evidence for which they were
looking, the American official accompanied them to Stonehill's business and assisted
by pointing out relevant documents and identifying key rooms to be searched. The
American official did not make a detailed examination of any of the documents and
did not control the disposition of the seized evidence. Id. at 740-42.
5, Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Court in Elkins commented on the difficulty courts experienced in determining the amount and type of
participation necessary to require the suppression of evidence under the "silver platter" doctrine. Id. at 212. The Court also noted the inconsistency and unpredictability
that resulted from the inability of the courts to lay down a clear standard. Id. at 21213.
,2 Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976).
3 See text accompanying notes 55-57 infra. Cf. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d
120, 140 (5th Cir. 1976) ("communication between law enforcement agencies of
different countries [is] beneficial . . . and [is] to be encouraged.")
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cies established by the federal courts and Congress in the military
context. 4
Under the JordanII holding, American officials, both civilian and
military, may not use evidence acquired in a foreign search that
violates American constitutional standards even where they had
merely provided information of a crime or the identity of suspects. 5
Such an interpretation seems unjustified since the standards for
searches and seizures vary from country to country. American police
officials should not be held responsible for the actions of their foreign
counterparts which they are unable to control. In the domestic context, federal and state officials operate under the same basic rules
with regard to searches and seizures. Both federal and state officials
are aware of the limitations of their authority to conduct searches.
Therefore, federal and state officials can effectively cooperate since
their counterparts are required to observe the same limitations imposed by the fourth amendment. Foreign police likely will observe
their own search and seizure law, which may be less restrictive than
the fourth amendment.5 7 By doing so, they will endanger the admissibility of evidence in American courts under the Jordan I rule, even
where American involvement is minimal, thus arguably discouraging
international cooperation in law enforcement.
In the military context, the Jordan II holding appears to conflict
with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the congressional preference for trials of American servicemen in American
courts.59 SOFA requires the signatory countries to assist in "all neces51 See note 59 infra.

Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976).
51Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 27-28
(1949).
5 See United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
The expression of congressional intent is found in Senate Resolution Ratifying
SOFA with Reservations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 8780,8837-38 (1953). The
complete resolution is reproduced at 4 U.S.T. at 1828. The Senate Resolution requires
commanding officers to review the law of the foreign country, and to request that the
country waive jurisdiction if they find that the constitutional rights the accused would
enjoy in the United States would be absent or denied in the foreign courts. 99 CONG.
REc. at 8780. See text accompanying note 63 infra. The apparently inevitable increase
in foreign trials also seems to contravene judicial preference. See Williams v. Froehlke,
490 F.2d 998, 1004 (2d Cir. 1974); Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371, 1374 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
COMA is a specialized Article I court that Congress created in 1950 under its
power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
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sary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production
of evidence. . . . ",0Under Jordan II however, military police, in direct contravention of SOFA, must refuse to assist the investigation
by foreign police into the possible criminal activities of American
servicemen where the foreign police do not comply with the fourth
amendment. If the military police chose to comply with SOFA and
assisted foreign police in searches of American servicemen, evidence
seized during that search necessarily would be suppressed in American courts-martial." This logically should result in the trial of more
servicemen in foreign courts since the foreign countries have primary
jurisdiction over American servicemen who commit crimes in their
territory.2 Since trials in foreign courts often ignore American constiForces." U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 14. See note 18 supra. Congress recognized that the
necessities of military discipline would require a special system of courts to balance
the requirements of discipline against the interest of insuring fairness to servicemen
charged with military offenses. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757-58 (1975);
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969). Although COMA is a legislative court,
it has the same responsibility as the Article III courts to protect persons from violations
of their constitutional rights. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953). COMA clearly
has authority to make interpretations of the Constitution in fulfilling its responsibility
within its area of expertise. United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 782-83, 21
C.M.R. 98, 104-05 (1956). Cf. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. at 140 (discussing separate
existence of military law); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757-58 (COMA
created to balance military interests with constitutional rights). COMA has recognized
that it is subject to the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, and that it
must abide by the restrictions of Congress expressed in the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§801
et seq. (1970), except where inconsistent with the Constitution. United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. at 782-83, 21 C.M.R. at 104-05. As early as 1953, COMA assumed
that it had authority to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. United States v.
Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (1953). Thus, it does not appear that
COMA exceeded it authority as a legislative court by contravening congressional intent or interpreting the Constitution.
1*SOFA, 4 U.S.T. at 1800, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. at 78. See note 38
supra.
62 Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976).
62 SOFA, 4 U.S.T. at 1800, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. at 78. Article VII,
§3(b) states that "[in the case of any ...offence [not against the property or
security of the sending state] the authorities of the receiving State shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction." A court-martial may be held only when the
foreign country waives jurisdiction. Id. Article VII, §3(c) states, "The authorities of the
State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from
the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State
considers such waiver to be of particular importance." Id. Under the Senate ratification of SOFA, a request for waiver of jurisdiction would be of particular importance
where an American serviceman in a foreign court would be denied constitutional rights
that would be available to him in a United States court. S. Res., 83d Cong., 1st Sess.,
99 CONG. REC. 8780 (1953). Under Jordan II, the American commanding officer might
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tutional rights,6 3 trial of American servicemen in these courts would
contravene the policy of Congress and the federal courts favoring trial
in American courts.6' The JordanII holding results in the neutralization of SOFA's requirement of cooperation in necessary investigations" because compliance would result in a violation of the Constitution. SOFA, like other treaties, is subject to the commands of the
Constitution." Thus, the Jordan II holding would seem to require
American officials to refuse to cooperate with foreign authorities
where American constitutional standards may not be observed.
In Jordan, COMA also departed from the traditional position of
the federal courts, exemplified by the Marzano discussion, to develop
a standard for judging the admissibility of evidence seized by foreign
police acting alone." In JordanI, COMA held that a search in which
evidence was seized by foreign police acting alone must comport with
the fourth amendment for the evidence to be admissible in an American court-martial." Prior to Jordan I, however, the fourth amendment had never been held to apply to the actions of foreign officials
or to evidence seized by them in violation of the fourth amendment."
still request waiver of jurisdiction to try the serviceman by court-martial. Unless untainted evidence was available, the suppression of evidence seized in the foreign search
most likely would result in an unsuccessful court-martial. The foreign country presumably would not waive jurisdiction in such a situation because of SOFA's provisions
against double jeopardy. SOFA, art. VII, §8, 4 U.S.T. at 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199
U.N.T.S. at 80.
0 SOFA guarantees only certain rights to individuals prosecuted by the foreign
country. These rights include confronting witnesses against him, a prompt and speedy
trial, information concerning the specific charges, compulsory process to obtain witnesses, legal counsel of his own choosing or provided by the foreign state, an interpreter, and the presence of a representative of his government. SOFA, art. VII, §9, 4
U.S.T. at 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. at 80. SOFA does not guarantee the
following rights that would be present in an American court: grand jury indictment,
public trial, trial by jury, prohibition against excessive bail and against cruel and
unusual punishment, and prohibition against compelling a witness to testify against
himself. In addition, COMA has asserted that trial in foreign court may deny the
serviceman access to the liberal rules of evidence, presumption of innocence, and
thorough review normally found in American courts. United States v. Burney, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 776, 802, 21 C.M.R. 98, 124 (1956).
6 See text accompanying note 59 supra.
See text accompanying note 60 supra.
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 419 (1920).
" Jordan I, 23 U.S.C.M.A. at 527, 50 C.M.R. at 666 (1975), modified, Jordan II,
24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976).
23 U.S.C.M.A. at 527, 50 C.M.R. at 666 (1975).
'3 See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968)("there is
nothing our courts can do that will require foreign officers to abide by our Constitu-
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The federal courts, in contrast to COMA, noted that the suppression
of evidence seized by foreign authorities acting independently would
be required only when the methods used by the foreign authorities
"shocked the conscience" of the court.70 The effect of the Jordan I
holding was to require the application of fourth amendment limitations to the actions of foreign officials in a way that seems neither
constitutionally required nor justified in view of the sovereignty of
foreign countries. 7'
Additionally, the holding of JordanI with regard to seizure solely
by foreign officials ignored the purpose of the exclusionary rule. The
Supreme Court has used two rationales to support the adoption of the
exclusionary rule: to insure the integrity of the judicial process,7 2 and
to require American officials to abide by the fourth amendment.73
The judicial integrity rationale is based on the belief that to preserve
public respect for the judiciary, courts must not sanction official
lawlessness in the form of illegal searches and seizures. 4 In foreign
searches without American participation however, there is no lawlessness by the United States government. Therefore, the American
tion."); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967); Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965).
7"See United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Callaway, 446 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585,
587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); Stonehill v. United States,
405 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 1968); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1965). In none of these cases did the courts exclude any evidence because the
methods used "shocked the conscience" of the court.
",Judge Cook raised this point in his dissent in Jordan I, 23 U.S.C.M.A. at 528,
50 C.M.R. at 667 (1975)(Cook, J., dissenting). This argument was adopted in Jordan
II to support the modification of the JordanI holding. 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 157, 51 C.M.R.
at 376 (1976).
72 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 392 (1914). The Weeks Court stated, "The
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction
by means of unlawful seizures . . .should find no sanction in the judgment of the
courts .. " Id. The judicial integrity reasoning perhaps received its strongest support as a rationale in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) and Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659 (1961).
11Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 393 (1914). The deterrence rationale was
lucidly set forth in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), where the Court
stated, "The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is
to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."
"' See note 72 supra. In Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.5 (9th Cir.
1967), the court stated that the exclusionary rule is applied not because the Constitution requires it, "but because it is inappropriate to sanction the previous violations of
law by federal officers." The court maintained that this policy could not be exported.
Id.
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courts would not associate themselves with official misconduct by
admitting the evidence, and the judicial integrity rationale thus
would seem to be inapplicable. In addition, the rationale is based on
the duty of the courts to enforce the commands of the Constitution.7 5
Nevertheless, the courts can only enforce the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures against federal officials through the fourth
amendment and against state officials through the fourteenth
amendment.7" Exclusion of evidence independently secured by foreign police does not support the courts' duty to enforce the Constitution since the Constitution cannot be applied to the actions of foreign
officials. 7
In recent years, the Supreme Court has placed primary emphasis
on the deterrence rationale as a justification for the exclusionary
rule.78 Under the deterrence rationale, the exclusionary rule has been
viewed as a remedy designed to compel respect for the fourth amendment. It is not a personal constitutional right of the individual injured by the search.7 The deterrence justification cannot support the
Jordan I holding regarding the seizure of evidence solely by foreign
officials. The Constitution does not and could not compel specific,
affirmative action by foreign governments to alter their search policies." Moreover, the exclusionary rule does not serve any educational
purpose for foreign officials, since they will follow the laws and constitutions of their own jurisdictions in conducting searches.',
Because the exclusionary rule is primarily a remedial device, its
application is justified only where that objective is best served.2
When a court chooses to apply the rule, the benefits and effectiveness
of the application must clearly be demonstrated, since a consequence
of the rule is the loss of reliable evidence. 3 Contrary to the assertion
" In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 392 (1914), the Court stated that "the
duty of giving [the fourth amendment] force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws."
7' See text accompanying notes 1-16 supra.
United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976); Kilday v. United
States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348
(9th Cir. 1967). See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
11United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3028 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 534 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
"' United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
"0Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir..1967).
" See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Tierney, 448 F.2d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1971). See also note 57 supra.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
Id. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971)(Burger,
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of the Jordan I majority,84 the JordanI holding would not encourage
foreign officials to observe our constitutional safeguards. Instead, the
JordanI holding could lead to a greater number of trials of American
servicemen in foreign courts because of the inadmissibility of the
evidence in American courts,85 a result contrary to congressional intent and judicial preference.86 Thus, the application of the fourth
amendment and the exclusionary rule to evidence seized in foreign
searches is unjustified since no deterrence results.
After granting a petition for reconsideration filed by the Air Force,
COMA modified its decision in Jordan 1.87 COMA held in Jordan II
that as a prerequisite to the admission of evidence seized by foreign
police acting alone, the prosecution must demonstrate that the search
by foreign police was legal under the law of their country.8 8The courts
of appeals, however, have held that evidence seized in a search conducted only by foreign police is not subject to the fourth amendment
and is admissible even though the search violates the law of the
foreign country. 8 The JordanII court compared the foreign search in
which Americans were not included to the "silver platter" doctrine,"0
and rejected the doctrine in the foreign context." Under the "silver
platter" doctrine, federal prosecutors were permitted to use evidence
seized by state officials, despite the fact that the seizure would have
required the suppression of evidence under the fourth amendment if
the seizure had been conducted by federal officials.2 The reasons for
rejecting the "silver platter" doctrine in federal-state relations, however, are inapplicable to the foreign context when American officials
are not involved. The doctrine is no longer used in federal-state relations because the fourteenth amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures on the part of state officers. 3 No section of the
C.J., dissenting).
23 U.S.C.M.A. at 527, 50 C.M.R. at 666 (1975).
See note 62 supra.
See note 59 supra.
'7 Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378 (1976).
Id. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378.
" United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1975); Stonehill v. United
States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968)(when Americans do not participate in a
foreign search, evidence seized should not be excluded although the foreign police
violated the fourth amendment and the constitution of the foreign government in
conducting the search).
See note 47 supra.
24 U.S.C.M.A. at 158, 51 C.M.R. at 377 (1976).
92 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S.
310 (1927). See note 47 supra.
11Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213-14 (1960). The Elkins Court main-
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Constitution has been or could be held to prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures by foreign police." Furthermore, the doctrine
was rejected because it encouraged federal officials to test how far
they could go in assisting state police in a search because of the
vagueness of the term "participation." 95 COMA cited the vagueness
of "participation" as a reason for not adopting the doctrine in the
foreign context. The "silver platter" doctrine is not relevant, however, to the foreign search where foreign police act alone. Since Americans are not involved, admitting the evidence seized by the foreign
officials cannot be said to encourage violation of the United States
Constitution. COMA apparently has made the logical error of applying a doctrine relevant in federal-state relations to foreign searches
conducted only by foreign officials, a factual circumstance which is
not analogous. 7
In addition, by requiring the exclusion of evidence seized in illegal
foreign searches conducted only by foreign officials, the Jordan II
holding continues to ignore the lack of support for exporting the sanctions of the exclusionary rule. Neither the judicial integrity rationale
nor the deterrence justification support the Jordan II holding when
the search is conducted only by foreign officials. Little strength can
be drawn from the deterrence justification because the United States
is the only country that has adopted the exclusionary rule as a
method of enforcing its constitutional standards. The deterrence
justification would support the imposition of the Jordan II holding
only if the evidence also would have been suppressed in the foreign
country. Where foreign police have acquired evidence of an American
offense, its suppression in an American court should make little difference to foreign police since they are not concerned with acquiring
tained that the underpinnings of the "silver platter" doctrine had been removed by
the decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which held that the fourteenth
amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures on the part of state officers.
"1 Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
'5 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 212 (1960).
"Jordan II, 24 U.S.C.M.A. at 158-59, 51 C.M.R. at 377-78 (1976).
'7 See generally I. CoPI, LTRODUCTION To Loomc 85-87 (4th ed. 1972).
" See text accompanying notes 74-77 supra.
" Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971)(Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The English courts allow the trial judge discretion to suppress evidence
"if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused." Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197, 204. In Kuruma, the House of Lords stated that
"the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is
relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned
with how the evidence was obtained." Id. at 203.
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a conviction. Because the exclusion of evidence in an American court
should have little or no effect upon the search methods of foreign
police, the holding results only in the suppression of potentially reliable, relevant evidence in American courts. If the evidence seized relates to a foreign offense, the American citizen would be tried in
foreign court where the evidence would be admitted nonetheless. Finally, since primary jurisdiction over the American serviceman who
commits a foreign offense is vested in the foreign country, suppression
of the evidence in an American court-martial possibly becomes immaterial since the serviceman may be tried in the foreign courts.'
Thus, the individual actions of foreign police in a foreign search,
whether conducted independently or in conjunction with American
officials, should not be governed by American constitutional standards.
American courts should carefully consider the issues presented by
the use of evidence seized in a foreign search and develop a standard
which will provide guidance to American officials who cooperate with
foreign police. The standard developed in Jordan II can only fetter
international cooperation;'' the substantial participation test devel"0 See note 62 supra.

"I See text accompanying notes 52-66 supra. A peripheral issue raised by the
conflict between the Jordan holdings and the traditional position of the courts of
appeals is the reviewability of COMA decisions. If the fourth amendment is applicable
to extraterritorial searches, it should not mean one thing in civilian trials and another
in military trials. Cf. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 153 (1953)(Douglas, J., dissenting)
(discussing meaning of prohibition against coerced confessions under the fifth amendment in military and civilian trials). If the conflict arose among the courts of appeals,
the Supreme Court could grant certiorari to resolve the conflicting interpretations. 28
U.S.C. §1254 (1970); Sup. CT. 19 (1)(b). However, Congress has not conferred jurisdiction on any Article III court to review court-martial determinations directly, including
the decisions of COMA. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746 (1975). When
certiorari is not available as a means of review, mandamus, injunction, declaratory
judgment, or habeas corpus are the only procedures available to seek review. L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIvE ACTION

177 (1965) [hereinafter cited as

JAFFE].

The federal courts may review by writ of habeas corpus court-martial determinations
where the serviceman is imprisoned, forfeits pay or allowances, or receives any penalty.
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. at 144. The federal courts will not allow the use of habeas
corpus until the injured party has exhausted all administrative remedies provided
under the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§801 et. seq. (1970). Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.
at 758; Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. at 142. Habeas corpus, however, may not be employed by the federal courts simply to re-evaluate the evidence. Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. at 142. Rather, habeas corpus requires the federal courts to determine only
whether the military courts have jurisdiction and have given full consideration to each
of the injured party's claims. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-74 (1969); Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. at 142. Nevo!rtheless, the writ of habeas corpus only provides a
mechanism for collateral review ot . determination adverse to a court-martial defen-
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dant. In addition, court-martial determinations adverse to the accused serviceman
may be reviewed collaterally through an action in the Court of Claims against the
United States for pay improperly withheld. 28 U.S.C. §1491 (1975). See, e.g., Cason
v. United States, 471 F.2d 1225 (Ct. Cl. 1973). In Jordan however, the defendent was
acquitted because of the suppression of evidence, and thus the government would
desire review.
The limitation on direct review by the federal courts found in Article 76 of the
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §876 (1970), does not change the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
Article III courts. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 749. The remedy most likely
to be used by the government to seek review of an adverse decision by COMA would
be the writ of mandamus. 28 U.S.C. §1361 (1970). To secure a writ of mandamus, the
government would still be required to exhaust all administrative remedies. Schlesinger
v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 756. In addition, the courts generally are reluctant to grant
mandamus where the duty is discretionary rather than ministerial. Wilmot v. Doyle,
403 F.2d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 1968). See JAFFE, supra at 181-82. Where COMA acts within
its jurisdiction as defined by Congress, its choices are normally unimpeachable. See
JAFFE, supra at 182. Cf. Barr v. United States, 478 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (agency may be ordered to exercise discretion but its choice
cannot be compelled). Nevertheless, where an Article I court is convinced that a
legislative court's decision is clearly contrary to the legislative court's jurisdiction or
statutory purpose, the Article I court may issue mandamus or other equitable relief.
See Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1973); Drew v. Lawrimore, 380
F.2d 479, 483 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 974 (1967); JAFFE, supra at 184.
Since COMA was established specifically to deal with the legal and constitutional
questions arising from the conflict between the demands of military discipline and the
constitutional rights of servicemen, Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758;
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969), Jordanclearly falls within this purpose.
Nevertheless, the issue raised in Jordan seems to require little expertise iri military
matters; it is, instead, primarily a constitutional question. The federal courts thus
could make the decision as easily as COMA. Cf. Sherman, JudicialReview of Military
Determinationsand the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REV. 483, 498
(1969)(arguing that the exhaustion requirement may be avoided where a substantial
constitutional question is raised that is outside the expertise or authority of the military tribunal). Allowing the government to seek collateral review by mandamus would
not violate the justiciability requirements of the federal courts since an active conflict
would continue to exist. Thus, there seems to be no bar to the government maintaining
an action for collateral review of the Jordan holding.
The major difficulty the government would need to confront in bringing such an
action is the discretionary character of COMA. COMA is free to interpret the Constitution in the military context and is limited only by the Constitution as interpreted by
the Supreme Court and the directions of Congress. United States v. Burney, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 776, 782-83, 21 C.M.R. 98, 104-05 (1956). See note 59 supra. COMA is thus
free to choose among competing considerations so long as it does not exceed these
limitations. In this sense, its actions are discretionary. Cf. JAFFE, supra at 181 (defining
discretion as the power to choose among competing considerations). Nevertheless, the
government might argue that in exercising its discretion, COMA has developed a rule
in Jordan II that is clearly contrary to the position of the federal courts. See text
accompanying note 41 supra. In interpreting the fourth amendment in this way,
COMA may have exercised its discretion contrary to the law, and perhaps violated its
clear duty to abide by the Constitution. If the federal courts may overrule a determination of COMA which is contrary to the position of the federal courts through the use
of habeas corpus, see, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), there would
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oped by the federal courts fails to provide necessary guidance to
American officials to assist them in determining the extraterritorial
application of the fourth amendment. 02 Rather than adopting the
strict position of COMA or the vague and excessively flexible position
of the courts of appeals, American courts should consider a third
position. Since all actions of American officials are governed by the
Constitution, 0 3 and since American courts cannot control the actions
of foreign officials, 04 the standard applied to determine the admissibility of evidence seized in foreign searches where American officials
are involved should be specific and focus exclusively on whether the
involvement of American officials in the search violated the fourth
amendment. 5 If the actions of the American officials are by themselves unconstitutional, evidence seized by the American officials
appear to be no bar to the use of mandamus under similar circumstances. Congress
could also provide for review of COMA's determinations by amending Article 76 of the
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §876 (1970), to allow discretionary review in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In addition, servicemen might seek review of COMA's holding in JordanII through
the use of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunction. If an accused serviceman
were confronted with a factual situation similar to Jordan, he arguably could seek
mandamus to compel his commanding officer to request a waiver of the foreign country's jurisdiction over him to allow trial by court-martial. See 28 U.S.C. §1361 (1970);
note 60 supra. In the same action in which the serviceman seeks mandamus, he also
could seek a declaratory judgment as to the constitutional validity of COMA's holding
in Jordan II, see 28 U.S.C. §2201 (1970); cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974)(state criminal statute's constitutionality may be attacked by request for declaratory judgment); Robson v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 631 (D.Pa.), vacated on other
grounds, 404 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1968)(constitutionality of prior conviction may be attacked by request for declaratory judgment), and request an injunction against the
application of the rule to evidence presented in his case. Of course, the serviceman
would have to demonstrate irreparable injury, see JAFFE, supra at 193-94, but this
should not be difficult because he may simply demonstrate the denial of constitutional
rights that would occur under the foreign country's judicial system, and the adverse
consequence of imprisonment in the foreign country's prisons. The serviceman might
avoid the reluctance of the courts to grant equitable relief where the action is discretionary by asserting that COMA has acted contrary to the law, and thus has violated
its clear duty to abide by the Constitution. The action could be maintained under 28
U.S.C. §1361 (1970) against the serviceman's commanding officer and the judges of
COMA as officers of the United States. 5 U.S.C. §2104 (1970). The theoretical action
for mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunction should be brought as a single
action, because the officials of the foreign country may be reluctant to waive jurisdiction unless there is some guarantee that relevant evidence crucial to a successful courtmartial would not be excluded. See note 62 supra.
102 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
103 See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
uo See text accompanying notes 67-100 supra.
05 See text accompanying note 45-48 supra.
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should be excluded. In addition, if the American officials suggest
actions to foreign officials that would be unconstitutional if performed by Americans, and the foreign officials then follow the suggestions, the evidence should be excluded as having been secured in
violation of the fourth amendment because of unconstitutional American involvement. The independent actions of the foreign police
should be irrelevant to the court's consideration of whether to admit
the evidence. This method of applying the fourth amendment to
foreign searches would deter American officials from violating the
fourth amendment, and would encourage the continued cooperation
06
of international law enforcement officials.
KEITH

D.

BOYETrE

,01On the Marzano facts, no suppression on fourth amendment grounds would
result under this test since it does not appear that American officials searched Marzano, recommended that a search be initiated, or suggested to the Grand Cayman
police what should be seized. On the Jordan facts, the American officials neither
recommended that a search be initiated nor suggested that British police seize anything in Jordan's room. Their presence at the scene of the search thus would become
the central element of inquiry. Military police have authority to enter a government
building including a barracks to protect the government's property. See United States
v. King, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 239, 240, 51 C.M.R. 618, 619 (1976); United States v. Thomas,
24 U.S.C.M.A. 228, 231, 51 C.M.R. 607, 610 (1976). But see United States v. Roberts,
No. 30,818, slip op. at 7 (C.M.A. October 8, 1976). The British police already had keys
to Jordan's room and there was no indication that the American police could have
prevented them from entering Jordan's room. The photographs taken by the Americans were requested by the British police and seized by them along with other evidence
of the burglary. Furthermore, the American police unlocked Jordan's locker at the
request of the British police. Although Jordan clearly had an expectation of privacy
protected by the fourth amendment, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967), the American police did not search the locker or seize anything. Thus, while it
might be argued that the action of unlocking the locker violated Jordan's fourth
amendment rights, the American police did not search the locker, seize any evidence
from the locker, or direct the British police to seize any evidence. The Americans
merely prevented the destruction of Jordan's property because the British police could
have broken the lock without American assistance. The actions of the military police
therefore do not appear unconstitutional. The better practice perhaps would be for
American military police to secure a warrant from the commanding officer in a situation similar to Jordan. See note 34 supra. Thus, no evidence would be suppressed under
the proposed standard in either Jordan or Marzano.
However, the proposed standard would result in the suppression of the evidence
seized in Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), see note 50 supra.
In Stonehill, the actions of the American agent were unconstitutional since he entered
Stonehill's business without a search warrant and identified evidence to be seized by
Philippine police. In addition, the American agent recommended that one specific
building be searched by the Philippine police. Thus, the American agent recommended
actions to foreign officials that would have been unconstitutional if performed by the
American. The foreign officials followed the American official's recommendations and
thus the evidence should be excluded as having violated the fourth amendment because of unconstitutional American involvement.

